Abstract. We consider a certain generalization of the hidden number problem introduced by Boneh and Venkatesan in 1996. Considering the XTR variation of Diffie-Hellman, we apply our results to show security of the log 1/2 p most significant bits of the secret, in analogy to the results known for the classical Diffie-Hellman scheme. Our method is based on bounds of exponential sums which were introduced by Deligne in 1977.
Introduction
When a new cryptosystem is proposed, some maturity period is normally needed before we see practical deployment. This is natural since some amount of public scrutiny is needed before we feel confident that there are no (serious) attacks possible. We can for instance see this in the case of elliptic curve cryptography where it is not until now, almost twenty years after the introduction by Koblitz and Miller [18, 31] , that we start to see commercial use. For this reason, a formal proof of security for a brand new scheme speeds up acceptance.
In 1994, Smith and Skinner [47] proposed a public key scheme, LUC, based on Lucas sequences modulo p. One reason for introducing LUC was a hope that there would not be any sub-exponential attacks on it. Although, this hope has failed, see [2] and the discussion below, LUC still seems to have both better speed and higher security than the classical Diffie-Hellman scheme [20] .
While Lucas sequences have a rich mathematical theory, and have seen applications in computer science, for example, primality testing, there has been no formal proof of security relative to for example, discrete logarithms. Indeed, shortly after publication, Bleichenbacher et al. showed in [2] that the very parameter settings that made LUC so efficient, also made it possible to reduce the security to discrete logarithms in IF p 2 , implying sub-exponential attacks. A natural question turns up: does LUC have other (worse) defects, not present in standard discrete logarithm based schemes?
One of the most recently proposed schemes is XTR, invented in 2000 by Lenstra and Verheul [23] . XTR can be thought of as a generalization of LUC to an extension field of degree six rather than two, and is based on initial ideas by Brouwer et al. [6] . The idea is to get a security against attackers corresponding to discrete logarithms in IF p 6 while the actual computation and messages exchanged are in IF p 2 . For XTR, a proof of security exists; breaking XTR is computationally equivalent to computing discrete logarithms in IF p 6 , see also [23] .
Still, even if completely breaking the respective schemes (LUC, XTR) requires finite field discrete logarithm computation, it is not clear what other security properties these schemes have. For instance, one can ask the natural question on "partial breaking", for example, in terms of computing certain bits of the XTR/LUC-secrets (the "logarithms").
The perhaps most interesting application of XTR (and LUC) is the DiffieHellman (DH) analogues; the exchanged messages are small, and, according to the recent evaluation [20, 22] of the relative performance of various cryptosystems, XTR and LUC are the fastest non-elliptic curve schemes. Hence, it would be important to establish bit-security results for the DH version; given the exchanged DH messages, can certain parts or bits of the DH secret key be computed? For the conventional DH scheme over IF p , such results were shown by Boneh and Venkatesan [4] , as consequences of a generalization of the hidden number problem introduced in the same paper [4] : given polynomially many t i and approximations to t i α (mod p), recover α. Their results roughly state that if one can compute all of the log 1/2 p most significant bits of the DH secret without errors, then the remaining bits can be found as well.
In fact, the original security proof of the Diffie-Hellman bits in [4] contained a slight gap, corrected in a later work by Shparlinski and González-Vasco [11] . That paper [11] is based on using bounds on certain exponential sums to establish approximate uniformity for some distributions over IF p .
For XTR, Shparlinski [45] has recently extended the techniques to show security also for the XTR Diffie-Hellman secret. We here improve these results and also extend the techniques to LUC Diffie-Hellman. Our results follow from bounds on exponential sums, established using algebraic-geometric means.
For prime fields IF p , or cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order, the security of all individual bits (except possibly the the least significant bits, depending on group order) of the discrete logarithms follows from the works [3, 13, 29, 38, 42] , showing that computing any single bit with non-negligible advantage (over the trivial 1/2) implies polynomial time discrete logarithm computations. In this paper we show that the results can be carried over to LUC in a natural way. Further, when the generator has even order, the predictability for the least significant bits also applies.
Preliminaries

Notation
Let p be a prime. To ease notation, we write IF for the prime field IF p , and IK for a degree m extension IF p m of IF. As usual we assume that IF is represented by {0, . . . , p − 1}. For integers s and r ≥ 1 denote by s r the remainder of s on division by r. We also use log z to denote the binary logarithm of z > 0. Let
be the trace of z ∈ IK in IF, see [28] for basics of the theory of finite fields. For a prime p and k ≥ 0 we denote by MSB k,p (x) any integer u such that
Roughly speaking MSB k,p (x) gives k most significant bits of x, however this definition is more flexible and suits better our purposes. In particular, in (1), k need not be integer. Also, the notion of most significant bits is tailored to modular residues and does not match the usual definition for integers.
Throughout the paper the implied constants in symbols 'O' depend on m and occasionally, where obvious, may depend on the small positive parameter δ; they all are effective and can be explicitly evaluated.
We now give a short introduction to the XTR and LUC cryptosystem, as well as to the hidden number problem and its use of lattices. The reader familiar with these can proceed directly to Sect. 3.
The XTR and LUC Cryptosystems
Below, we concentrate only on the details relevant to this work.
Let m = 2 so that IK = IF p 2 and let Tr IK/IF (u) = Tr(u) as above. Let g ∈ IK be a root of an irreducible quadratic polynomial f (X) = X 2 −P X +1 ∈ IF p [X], thus P 2 − 4 is a quadratic non-residue of IF p . It is easy to show that such elements exist. For example, for any root ϑ ∈ IK of an arbitrary irreducible quadratic polynomial over IF, g = ϑ p−1 is such an element. Note also that f above is the characteristic polynomial of the recurrence V n (P ) ≡ P V n−1 (P ) − V n−2 (P ) (mod p), V 0 = 2, V 1 = P , and that V n (P ) = Tr(g n ). In the LUC variant of Diffie-Hellman (known as LUCDIF) the communicating parties exchange Tr (g x ) and Tr (g y ) (that is, V x (P ) and V y (P )), then, using V xy (P ) = V x (V y (P )) = V y (V x (P )), compute the common secret Tr (g xy ). For details refer to [2, 47] .
XTR can be thought of as a generalization of LUC and has been introduced by Lenstra and Verheul, see [6, 23-25, 43, 48] 
The Hidden Number Problem
We shall be interested in a variant of the hidden number problem introduced by Boneh and Venkatesan [4, 5] . The problem can be stated as follows: recover an unknown α ∈ IF, given approximations to αt p for polynomially many known random t ∈ IF. Let G be a subgroup of the multiplicative group IK * . Motivated by the application of bit security for XTR and LUC, we consider the following question: recover α ∈ IK, given approximations of Tr(αt) for polynomially many known random t ∈ G. Then we apply our results to obtain a statement about the bit security of the XTR and LUC cryptosystems.
For the general hidden number problem, it has turned out that for many applications (as we shall see, including the one at hand) the condition that t is selected uniformly at random is too restrictive. Examples include the earlier bit security results for the Diffie-Hellman, Shamir, and several other cryptosystems [11, 12] and rigorous results on attacks (following the heuristic arguments of [14, 32] ) on the DSA(-like) signature schemes [9, 33, 34] .
The aforementioned papers [9, 11, 12, 33, 34] have exploited that the method of [4] can be adjusted to the case when t is selected from a sequence which has some uniformity of distribution property. Thus, a central ingredient is bounds on exponential sums; a natural tool to establish such properties.
Bounds on Exponential Sums
The case when t is selected from a small subgroup of IF * was studied in [11] to generalize (and correct) the results of [4] on the bit security of the Diffie-Hellman key in IF p . The results of [11] are based on bounds of exponential sums with elements of subgroups of IF * , namely on Theorems 3.4, 5.5 of [19] . Unfortunately, analogues of the bounds of exponential sums of Theorems 3.4, 5.5 of [19] are not known for non-prime fields. However, in [45] an alternative method of [44] has been used, which applies to very small subgroups G and is based on bounds of [7, 10] for the number of solutions of certain equations in finite fields. Unfortunately it produces much weaker results.
It is remarked in [45] that for subgroups G of cardinality |G| ≥ p m/2+δ , with any fixed δ > 0, the bound of exponential sums given by Theorem 8.78 in [28] combined with Theorem 8.24 of the same work (see also (3.15) in [19] ) can be used. These bounds would provide analogues of the results [4, 11] but, unfortunately, the subgroups G associated with XTR and LUC fall below this square-root threshold.
Nevertheless, thanks to the special property of these subgroup, we show in Sect. 3 how one can use an approach from [8] , developed in [26, 27] , to apply the exponential sum technique to studying the subgroups related to XTR and LUC. We get a substantial improvement to the results of [45] on the bit-security for XTR (from αn bits for a constant 0 < α < 1, to log 1/2 n bits), and a new equally strong result for LUC.
Lattices
As in [4, 5] , our results related to the hidden number problem rely on rounding techniques in lattices. We review a few related results and definitions. Let {b 1 , . . . , b s } be a set of linearly independent vectors in IR s . The set
is called an s-dimensional full rank lattice with basis {b 1 , . . . , b s }. For a vector u, let u denote its Euclidean norm.
It has been remarked in [30] , and then in [35, 36] that the following statement holds, which is somewhat stronger than that usually used in the literature. It follows from the lattice basis reduction algorithm of [21] and results of [41, 15] . Lemma 1. There exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm which, for a given s-dimensional full rank lattice L and r ∈ IR s , finds v ∈ L with
Distribution of Trace
First, we need the following result which, as mentioned, is essentially Theorem 8.78 of [28] (combined with Theorem 8.24 of the same work) or the bound (3.15) of [19] . Let G be a subgroup of IK = IF p m .
Lemma 2. For any γ ∈ IK * , we have for almost all primes p, respectively, which underlies the result of [11] . However these results have not been extended to composite fields (and it seems that such extensions will require some substantially new ideas). Nevertheless, applying the results of [8, 26, 27] for some special subgroups we obtain non-trivial estimates beyond the p m/2 -threshold. For a divisor s|m let N s be the set of z ∈ IK with Nm s (z) = 1, where
. Our results depend on the following estimate conjectured by Deligne in [8] (and proved in the case of the trivial character χ = χ 0 ). In the full generality it has been proved by Katz [17] (to be precise Theorem 4.1.1 of [17] and some standard transformations). For the cases relevant to XTR and LUC, we may also refer to the simpler and more explicit statements of [26, 27] .
Lemma 3. For any divisor s|m, any γ ∈ IK * , and any multiplicative character χ of IK, we have
To proceed, recall the following property of the group of characters of an abelian group.
Lemma 4. Let H be an abelian group and let H = Hom(H, C * ) be its dual group. Then for any character χ of H,
where χ 0 ∈ H is the trivial character.
Lemma 5. For any divisor s|m, any subgroup G of N s and any γ ∈ IK * ,
Proof. Let Ω G be the set of all multiplicative characters of N s , trivial on G.
Using Lemma 4, we write
Applying the inequality of Lemma 3, we obtain the desired estimate.
For γ ∈ IK and integers r and h, denote by N γ (G, r, h) the number of solutions of the congruence Tr(γt) ≡ r + y (mod p), t ∈ G, y = 0, . . . , h − 1.
Using standard relations between the uniformity of distribution and bounds of exponential sums, for example, see Corollary 3.11 of [37] , from Lemma 2 and Lemma 5 one immediately derives the following asymptotic formulas for N γ (G, r, h).
Lemma 6. For any γ ∈ IK * and any subgroup G ⊆ IK * , we have
Lemma 7. For any divisor s|m, any subgroup G ⊆ N s , and any γ ∈ IK * ,
These bounds can be turned into statements on the form of the shortest vector in certain lattices. Let ω 1 , . . . , ω m be a fixed basis of IK over IF
Lemma 8. Let p be a sufficiently large prime number and let G be a subgroup of IK * with |G| ≥ p m/2+δ for some fixed δ > 0. Then for
the following holds. Let α = a 1 ω 1 +. . .+a m ω m , a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ IF, be a fixed element of IK. Assume that t 1 , . . . , t d ∈ G are chosen uniformly and independently at random. Then with probability exceeding
with some integers b j ≡ a j (mod p), j = 1, . . . , m.
Proof. As in [4] we define the modular distance between two integers r and l as dist p (r, l) = min
We see from Lemma 6 that for any β ∈ IK with β = α the probability P (β) that dist p (Tr(αt), Tr(βt)) ≤ 2 −η+1 p for t ∈ G selected uniformly at random is
for large enough p. Therefore, with d = (m + 1)/(η − 3) , for any β ∈ IK,
where the probability is taken over t 1 , . . . , t d ∈ G chosen uniformly and independently at random. From here, we derive
The rest of the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 5 of [4] . Indeed, we fix some t 1 , . . . , t d ∈ G with
Let v ∈ L k (t 1 , . . . , t d ) be a lattice point satisfying
since otherwise there would be i ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that |v i − s i | > 2 −η p. Now suppose that b j ≡ a j (mod p) for some j = 1, . . . , m. Put β = b 1 ω 1 + . . . + b m ω m . In this case we have
that contradicts our assumption. As we have seen, the condition (3) holds with probability exceeding 1 − p −1 and the result follows.
Accordingly, using Lemma 7 instead of Lemma 6 we obtain:
Lemma 9. Let p be a sufficiently large prime number and let s be a divisor of m. Let G be a subgroup of N s with |G| ≥ |N s | 1/2 p δ for some fixed δ > 0. Then for
the following holds. Let α = a 1 ω 1 +. . .+a m ω m , a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ IF, be a fixed element of IK. Assume that t 1 , . . . , t d ∈ G are chosen uniformly and independently at random. Then with probability exceeding 1 − p −1 for any s = (s 1 , . . . , s d , 0, . . . , 0) with
Hidden Number Problem for the Trace
Using Lemma 8 in the same way as Theorem 5 of [4] was used in the proof of Theorem 1 of that paper, we obtain Theorem 1. Let p be a sufficiently large prime number and let G be a subgroup of IK * with |G| ≥ p m/2+δ for some fixed δ > 0. Then for k = 2 log 1/2 p , d = 4(m + 1) log 1/2 p , the following holds. There exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm A such that for any α ∈ IK given 2d values t i ∈ G and s i = MSB k,p (Tr(αt i )), i = 1, . . . , d, its output satisfies
. . , t d are chosen uniformly and independently at random from G.
Proof. We follow the arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 in [4] , here briefly outlined for completeness. We refer to the first d vectors in the matrix (2) (2) by a j and subtracting a certain multiple of the jth p-vector for j = 1, . . . , m, we obtain a lattice point
Let η = log 1/2 p . By Lemma 1 (with a slightly rougher constant 2
provided that p is large enough. We also have
Applying Lemma 8, we see that v = u α with probability at least 1 − p −1 , and therefore the components a 1 , . . . , a m of α can be recovered from the last m components of v = u α .
Accordingly, Lemma 9 implies:
Theorem 2. Let p be a sufficiently large prime number and let s be a divisor of m, s|m. Let G be a subgroup of of N s with |G| ≥ |N s | 1/2 p δ for some fixed δ > 0. Then for k = 2 log 1/2 p , d = 4(m+1) log 1/2 p the following holds. There exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm A such that for any α ∈ IK given 2d values t i ∈ G and s i = MSB k,p (Tr(αt i )), i = 1, . . . , d, its output satisfies
Bit Security of XTR
From Theorem 24 of [48] (see also [6, 23, 25] ), any efficient algorithm to compute Tr IK/IL (g xy ) from g x and g y can be used to construct an efficient algorithm to compute g xy from the same information. In [43] the same result was obtained with an algorithm which computes Tr IK/IL (g xy ) only for a positive proportion of pairs g x , g y . Furthermore, the same results hold even for algorithms which compute only Tr (g xy ). Any v ∈ IL can be represented by a pair Tr IL/IF (v), Tr IL/IF (ϑv) where ϑ is a root of an irreducible quadratic polynomial over IF, so Tr (g xy ) is a part of the representation of Tr IK/IL (g xy ). In fact the same result holds for Tr (ωg xy ) with any fixed ω ∈ IK * . Thus the above results suggest that breaking XTR is not easier than breaking the classical Diffie-Hellman scheme. Here we obtain one more result of this kind. We would like to show that an oracle computing a certain proportion of bits of Tr (g xy ) from Tr IK/IL (g x ) and Tr IK/IL (g y ) can be used to break classical DiffieHellman. However, we instead prove that an oracle that computes a certain proportion of bits of Tr (g xy ) from g x , g y can be used to compute g xy from g
x , g y . This is stronger; the former oracle could be used to simulate the latter so if the latter oracle cannot exist, neither can the former.
Thus, to really benefit from our results, one would need to use the trace over IF p rather than IF p 2 in XTR based systems. As Tr(z) = Tr IK/IL (z) + Tr IK/IL (z) p and as pth powers are "free" in XTR (due to the specific representation of IF p 2 ) this could easily be done.
For a positive integer k we denote by X T R k the oracle such that for any given values of g x and g y , it outputs MSB k,p (Tr (g xy )).
Theorem 3. Let p be a sufficiently large n-bit prime number. Suppose the XTR generator g has prime order l satisfying l|p 2 − p + 1 and l ≥ p 3/2+δ for some fixed δ > 0. Then there exists a polynomial time algorithm which, given U = g u and V = g v , for some u, v ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1}, makes O(log 1/2 p) calls of the oracle X T R k with k = 2 log 1/2 p and computes g uv correctly with probability at least
Proof. The case u = 0 is trivial. Now assume that 1 ≤ u ≤ l − 1. Then g u = g u is an element of order l (because l is prime). Select random r ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1}. Applying the oracle X T R k to U and V r = g v+r = V g r we obtain MSB k,p Tr g
, we can now apply Theorem 2 with α = g uv , m = 6, and the group G generated by g u (equal to the group generated by g). Indeed, we see that
thus G ∈ N 2 and from Theorem 2 we obtain the desired result.
Bit Security of LUC
For a positive integer k we denote by LUC k an oracle that for any given values of g x , g y , outputs MSB k,p (Tr (g xy )). In complete analogy with the proof of Theorem 3 we establish the following.
Theorem 4. Let p be a sufficiently large n-bit prime number. Suppose the LUC generator g has prime order l satisfying l|p + 1 and l ≥ p 1/2+δ for some fixed δ > 0. Then there exists a polynomial time algorithm which, given U = g u and V = g v , for some u, v ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1}, makes O(log 1/2 p) calls of the oracle LUC k with k = 2 log 1/2 p and outputs g uv with probability at least 1 − p −δ/2 .
Hard-core Bits of LUC
The security of LUC clearly depends on the hardness of inverting the function
where, as above, g is the LUC generator of order l|p + 1. That is, it is necessary that this is a one-way function, otherwise the LUCDIF scheme would clearly be insecure. Even if this is true, the function could still have other undesirable properties in the form of "leakage", for example, it may be possible to determine individual bits of x. Note that Theorem 4 roughly says that, unless f g (x) can be efficiently inverted, it cannot be the case that all of the log 1/2 p most significant bits of x can be simultaneously computed without errors from f g (x). Still, it does not exclude the possibility of computing in polynomial time a single bit of x, with probability, say, 1/2 + ε(log p) for a non-negligible function ε(n). (Recall that ν(n) is negligible if for any c > 0, ν(n) = o(n −c ).) As usual let {0, 1}
* denote the set of all finite binary strings and let G n , G * be some subsets of {0, 1} n , {0, 1} * , respectively. Suppose f : G * → {0, 1} * and b : G * → {0, 1}. Then b is called a hard-core function for f if for all non-negligible ε(n) and all probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, for sufficiently large n,
probability taken over x ∈ G n and the random coin tosses required by A. We are interested in the case that f (x) = V x (P ) = Tr(g x ) and b(x) = bit i (x), the ith bit of x (where bit 0 (x) = lsb(x) is the least significant bit). A problem is that V x (P ) is not uniquely invertible. Note however that V x (P ) = V z (P ), precisely when z = l − x. To make "the ith bit of x" well-defined by V x (P ), we restrict the domain to {x | x < l/2}. (This hurts the group structure, but not our proofs.) Hence, we also assume that the oracle's advantage is averaged over this smaller set.
In Sect. 6, we assumed the existence of an oracle that returned Tr(tg x ), where the oracle took care of selecting t (and computing the answer). Here we need that we from Tr(g x ) can ourselves efficiently compute values of form Tr(g wx+s ) for w, s of our own choice. Note that by the Diffie-Hellman-like properties of LUC, the case s = 0 is easy. We thus start with a certain technical statement. Why traces of this form is of interest will shortly be made clear. Proof. As observed in [2] , the conjugates of g x are the roots, H 0 , H 1 , of X 2 − Tr(g x )X + 1, and they can be found in polynomial time. The conjugates h 0 , h 1 of g are trivial to compute and H i = h x π(i) for some permutation π ∈ S 2 . Thus, for any w = k −1 r and s,
Now, we do not know π, but there are only two possibilities. We thus obtain two candidates T ν , ν = 1, 2.
As noted, as with conventional discrete logarithm not all bits are secure.
Theorem 5. Suppose l = 2 s r, s > 0, r odd. There is a polynomial time algorithm to determine bit i (x) from V x (P ) for every i = 0, . . . , s − 1.
Proof. For the least significant bit, note that V xl/2 (P ) = (−1) lsb(x) V 0 (P ), a condition that can be easily checked. Using Lemma 10, the rest follows from a straight-forward generalization of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [39] to decide x (mod 2 s ).
All other bits are, however, hard:
Theorem 6. Let c > 0 be a constant. Except with probability o(1) over random choices of n-bit prime p = 2 s r − 1, r odd, and g the LUC generator of order l = p + 1, the following holds. If for some i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n − c log n there is an algorithm that given V x (P ) for random x, computes bit i (x) with probability at least 1/2 + ε(n), then there is a probabilistic algorithm that in time polynomial in nε(n) −1 computes x with non-negligible probability.
Proof. In [38, 13] , reductions are given from discrete logarithms in IF p to computing bit i (x) from g x , for any i. The reduction only uses operations transforming y = g
x into values of form y
ax+b . By Lemma 10, the same transformations can be applied to Tr(g x ), for invertible k (as will be the case). The only complication that arise is that we have here restricted the domain of V x (P ) = Tr(g x ) to x < l/2. However, a closer look at [13] we see that in each step of the reduction, a good approximation to the relative magnitude of each k −1 ax + b (modulo the order of g) is maintained. Using this information, we simply discard all samples on k −1 ax + b > l/2. As the samples are uniformly distributed, this increases the complexity by a factor two. Taking into account the two choices for the list of samples from Lemma 10, we loose another (noncritical) factor of two, trying both possibilities.
For prime l, l|p + 1, the same result follows for all i and all large p from [42] .
We note that the k = O(log n) most significant bits of x can also be shown to be hard by [13] and a security notion for biased functions from [46] . For such k, from [3, 29] also follows hardness for the "related" function MSB k,p .
Hard-core Bits of XTR
Superficially, all details (for example, a generalization of Lemma 10) seem to go through for XTR. However, problems are encountered by the fact that the XTR function, Tr IF p 6 /IF p 2 (g x ), is three-to-one, rather than two-to-one, and there seems to be no obvious way to restrict the domain to a set on which: (a) XTR is 1-1, (b) the set has non-negligible density, and, (c) the set is an interval, [a..b] ⊂ Z Z l . These properties seem necessary to apply the techniques of [13] .
Summary and Open Problems
Establishing security of new cryptosystems is important. We have shown that LUC and XTR share security properties with the more well-established discrete logarithm based systems. The Diffie-Hellman variant enjoys security features as of the original Diffie-Hellman key exchange. To this end, we have seen a new application for exponential sums; we believe there are more such in store. This paper is the most recent in a series studying variants of the hidden number problem, using such exponential sums. One can ask if there is a "general" theorem to be sought, rather than treating each special case. Such generalization seem difficult though: make the group a little smaller (for example, the proposed XTR-extensions to IF p 2·3·5 ) and everything breaks down.
For the LUC scheme, we also showed that no non-trivial information about individual bits leak. Though likely to be true, the analogue for XTR is left open.
